Results for 'E. I. Coffman'

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  1. Contextualism and Interest-Relative Invariantism.E. I. Coffman - 2012 - In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum. pp. 199.
    Classical Invariantism (CI): The truth-value of a given knowledge-ascribing (-denying) sentence is (a) invariant across conversational contexts and (b) independent of how important it is to the subject (S) that the relevant proposition (P) be true.
     
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  2. Thinking about luck.E. J. Coffman - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):385-398.
    Luck looms large in numerous different philosophical subfields. Unfortunately, work focused exclusively on the nature of luck is in short supply on the contemporary analytic scene. In his highly impressive recent book Epistemic Luck, Duncan Pritchard helps rectify this neglect by presenting a partial account of luck that he uses to illuminate various ways luck can figure in cognition. In this paper, I critically evaluate both Pritchard’s account of luck and another account to which Pritchard’s discussion draws our attention—viz., that (...)
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  3. Does luck exclude control?E. J. Coffman - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):499-504.
    Many philosophers hold that luck excludes control-more precisely, that an event is lucky for you only if that event lies beyond your control. Call this the Lack of Control Requirement (LCR) on luck. Jennifer Lackey [2008] has recently argued that there is no such requirement on luck. Should such an argument succeed, it would (among other things) disable a main objection to the "libertarian" position in the free will debate. After clarifying the LCR, I defend it against both Lackey's argument (...)
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  4. Warrant without truth?E. J. Coffman - 2008 - Synthese 162 (2):173-194.
    This paper advances the debate over the question whether false beliefs may nevertheless have warrant, the property that yields knowledge when conjoined with true belief. The paper’s first main part—which spans Sections 2–4—assesses the best argument for Warrant Infallibilism, the view that only true beliefs can have warrant. I show that this argument’s key premise conflicts with an extremely plausible claim about warrant. Sections 5–6 constitute the paper’s second main part. Section 5 presents an overlooked puzzle about warrant, and uses (...)
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  5.  57
    On Making an Effort.E. J. Coffman - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (1):11-21.
    This aper is in the main a critical study of Robert Kane's account of the nature of Free Choice. I begin by briefly describing Kane's theory. I then consider four questions about a concept that is...
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  6.  53
    Do We Decide Intentionally?E. J. Coffman - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):822-827.
    ABSTRACTIn a recent article in this journal, Joshua Shepherd presents and rejects a new argument for the sceptical conclusion that everyday decisions aren't intentional actions. After relating his focal argument to a different argument for the same conclusion that is presented and rejected by Alfred Mele, I defend these arguments from extant criticisms, and develop new objections that shed light on the intentionality of typical decisions.
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  7.  16
    Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions.E. J. Coffman - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):220-231.
    Say that a ‘practical decision’ is a momentary intentional mental action of intention formation. According to what I’ll call the ‘Decisional Prior Intention Thesis’ (‘DPIT’), each practical decision is intentional at least partly in virtue of the representational content of some previously acquired intention. DPIT is entailed by the following widely endorsed thesis that I’ll call the ‘General Prior Intention Thesis’ (‘GPIT’): each intentional action is intentional at least partly in virtue of the representational content of some previously acquired intention. (...)
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  8. Misleading Dispositions and the Value of Knowledge.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:241-258.
    Gettiered beliefs are those whose agents are subject to the kind of epistemologically significant luck illustrated by Gettier Cases. Provided that knowledge requires ungettiered belief, we can learn something about knowledge by figuring out how luck blocks it in Gettier Cases. After criticizing the most promising of the going approaches to gettiered belief—the Risk of False Belief Approach—, I explain and defend a new approach: the Risk of Misleading Dispositions Approach.Roughly, this view says that a belief is gettiered just in (...)
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  9.  19
    Misleading Dispositions and the Value of Knowledge.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:241-258.
    Gettiered beliefs are those whose agents are subject to the kind of epistemologically significant luck illustrated by Gettier Cases. Provided that knowledge requires ungettiered belief, we can learn something about knowledge by figuring out how luck blocks it in Gettier Cases. After criticizing the most promising of the going approaches to gettiered belief—the Risk of False Belief Approach—, I explain and defend a new approach: the Risk of Misleading Dispositions Approach.Roughly, this view says that a belief is gettiered just in (...)
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  10. Two claims about epistemic propriety.E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):471-488.
    This paper has two main parts. In the first part, I argue that prominent moves in two related current debates in epistemology—viz., the debates over classical invariantism and the knowledge first movement—depend on one or the other of two claims about epistemic propriety: (1) Impropriety due to lack of a particular epistemic feature suffices for epistemic impropriety; and (2) Having justification to believe P suffices for having warrant to assert P. In the second part, I present and defend novel arguments (...)
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  11.  34
    Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions.E. J. Coffman - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):220-231.
    Say that a ‘practical decision’ is a momentary intentional mental action of intention formation. According to what I’ll call the ‘Decisional Prior Intention Thesis’, each practical decisio...
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  12.  25
    The consequence argument and ordinary human agency.E. J. Coffman - 2024 - Synthese 203 (3):1-11.
    Brian Cutter (Analysis 77: 278-287, 2017) argues that one of the most prominent versions of the consequence argument—viz., Peter van Inwagen’s (An Essay on Free Will. Oxford University Press, 1983) ‘Third Formal Argument’—does not support an incompatibility thesis that every paradigmatic compatibilist would reject. Justin Capes (Thought 8: 50-56, 2019) concedes Cutter’s conclusion concerning van Inwagen’s Third Formal Argument and tries to meet the important challenge that Cutter issues at the end of his paper—viz., articulate a promising version of the (...)
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  13. Defending Klein on Closure and Skepticism.E. J. Coffman - 2006 - Synthese 151 (2):257-272.
    In this paper, I consider some issues involving a certain closure principle for Structural Justification, a relation between a cognitive subject and a proposition that’s expressed by locutions like ‘S has a source of justification for p’ and ‘p is justifiable for S’. I begin by summarizing recent work by Peter Klein that advances the thesis that the indicated closure principle is plausible but lacks Skeptical utility. I then assess objections to Klein’s thesis based on work by Robert Audi and (...)
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  14. Justification before knowledge?E. J. Coffman - manuscript
    This paper assesses several prominent recent attacks on the view that epistemic justification is conceptually prior to knowledge. I argue that this view—call it the Received View (RV)—emerges from these attacks unscathed. I start with Timothy Williamson’s two strongest arguments for the claim that all evidence is knowledge (E>K), which impugns RV when combined with the claim that justification depends on evidence. One of Williamson’s arguments assumes a false epistemic closure principle; the other misses some alternative (to E>K) explanations of (...)
     
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  15. Omniprescience and serious deliberation.E. J. Coffman - unknown
    Let’s say that you are omniprescient iff you always believe—occurrently and with maximal confidence—all and only truths, including ones about the future. Several philosophers have argued that an omniprescient being couldn’t engage in certain kinds of activity.[1] In what follows, I present and assess the most promising such argument I know of—what I’ll call the Serious Deliberation Argument (SDA). It concludes that omniprescience rules out serious deliberation—i.e., trying to choose between incompatible courses of action once you know that none is (...)
     
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  16. How (not) to attack the luck argument.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.
    The Luck Argument is among the most influential objections to the main brand of libertarianism about metaphysical freedom and moral responsibility. In his work, Alfred Mele [2006. Free will and luck . Oxford: Oxford University Press] develops - and then attempts to defeat - the literature's most promising version of the Luck Argument. After explaining Mele's version of the Luck Argument, I present two objections to his novel reply to the argument. I argue for the following two claims: (1) Mele's (...)
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  17. Knowledge first?E. J. Coffman - unknown
    The Orthodox View (OV) of the relation between epistemic justification and knowledge has it that justification is conceptually prior to knowledge—and so, can be used to provide a noncircular account of knowledge. OV has come under threat from the increasingly popular “Knowledge First” movement (KFM) in epistemology. I assess several anti-OV arguments due to three of KFM’s most prominent members: Timothy Williamson, Jonathan Sutton, and Alexander Bird. I argue that OV emerges from these attacks unscathed.
     
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  18. Blameworthiness, Willings, and Practical Decisions.E. J. Coffman - 2021 - Philosophical Inquiries 9:49-56.
    What kinds of things can we be morally responsible for? Andrew Khoury offers an answer that includes (i) an argument for the impossibility of blameworthiness for overt action, and (ii) the assertion that “willings are the proper object of responsibility in the context of action”. After presenting an argument for the inconsistency of Khoury’s answer to our focal question, I defend the following partial answer that resembles, but differs importantly from, Khoury’s answer: one can be blameworthy for a practical decision—that (...)
     
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  19. Critical notice of Jonathan Sutton, without justification.E. J. Coffman - forthcoming - Philosophical Books.
    In Without Justification,[1] Jonathan Sutton undermines the orthodox view that a justified belief needn’t constitute knowledge; develops a battery of arguments for the unorthodox thesis that you justifiedly believe P iff you know P; and explores the topics of testimony and inference in light of his equation of justification and knowledge (J=K). This book is essential reading at epistemology’s cutting edge. In §I, we’ll take an extended tour of the book, raising various questions and objections along the way. In §II, (...)
     
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  20. Stump on the Nature of Atonement.E. J. Coffman - 2012 - In Kelly James Clark & Michael Rea (eds.), Science, Religion, and Metaphysics: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 144-151.
    In “The Nature of the Atonement”, Eleonore Stump explores the problem of human sin that the atonement is meant to solve, helpfully uncovering important adequacy conditions for theories of atonement. She then uses those conditions to critically evaluate Anselmian and Thomistic theories of atonement, arguing (among many other interesting things) that the Thomist has a leg up on the Anselmian when it comes to the atonement-motivating problem of human sin (pp.11-12 of ms.). I argue for two claims in what follows. (...)
     
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  21. Two mistakes about epistemic propriety.E. J. Coffman - unknown
    Impropriety due to lack of a particular epistemic feature suffices for epistemic impropriety; and (2) Having justification to believe P suffices for having warrant to assert P. I present and defend arguments against both claims. These arguments undermine (among other things) (a) the main counterexamples to the view that knowledge suffices for warrant to assert; (b) a main argument that justified belief suffices for knowledge; and (c) a promising defense of the Credit Requirement on knowledge.
     
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  22.  30
    Direct Blameworthiness for Non-conduct?E. J. Coffman - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1087-1094.
    Peter Graham argues against the prima facie plausible thesis that one can be directly blameworthy only for one’s conduct—that is, only for one’s actions or omissions to act. Because this thesis serves as a premise in a challenging recent argument for the revisionist conclusion that we’re at most rarely directly blameworthy for anything, Graham’s argument holds out a promise of contributing to a defense of a wide range of commonsense ascriptions of blameworthiness. After reconstructing Graham’s argument for the possibility of (...)
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  23.  60
    Does knowledge secure warrant to assert?E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):285 - 300.
    This paper fortifies and defends the so called Sufficiency Argument (SA) against Classical Invariantism. In Sect. 2,I explain the version of the SA formulated but then rejected by Brown (2008a). In Sect. 3, I show how cases described by Hawthorne (2004), Brown (2008b), and Lackey (forthcoming) threaten to undermine one or the other of the SA's least secure premises. In Sect. 4,I buttress one of those premises and defend the reinforced SA from the objection developed in Sect. 3.
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  24.  97
    Alfred Mele's metaphysical freedom?E. J. Coffman & Ted A. Warfield - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194.
    In this paper we raise three questions of clarification about Alfred Mele's fine recent book, Free Will and Luck. Our questions concern the following topics: (i) Mele's combination of 'luck' and 'Frankfurt-style' objections to libertarianism, (ii) Mele's stipulations about 'compatibilism' and the relation between questions about free action and questions about moral responsibility, and (iii) Mele's treatment of the Consequence Argument.
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  25.  37
    Involuntarism impugned?E. J. Coffman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-11.
    Blake Roeber argues that examples of a certain neglected kind cast doubt on the following piece of epistemological orthodoxy: your acquisition of a particular belief couldn’t itself be a directly voluntary action. In this paper, I undermine and then rebut Roeber’s anti-involuntarism conclusion. After arguing for the denial of one of the premises on which Roeber’s conclusion is based, I articulate a plausible pro-involuntarism explanation of Roeber’s focal example.
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  26. Problems for Foley's Accounts of Rational Belief and Responsible Belief.E. J. Coffman & Matt Deaton - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):147-160.
    In this paper, we argue that Richard Foley’s account of rational belief faces an as yet undefeated objection, then try to repair one of Foley’s two failed replies to that objection. In §§I-III, we explain Foley’s accounts of all-things-considered rational belief and responsible belief, along with his replies to two pressing objections to those accounts—what we call the Irrelevance Objection(to Foley’s account of rational belief) and the Insufficiency Objection (to his account of responsible belief). In §IV, we argue that both (...)
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  27.  56
    Clarke's Defense of the Contrast Argument.E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (2):267-275.
    In his (2004), Randolph Clarke assesses an important version of an influential argument against libertarianism about metaphysical freedom. Clarke calls the anti-libertarian argument he evaluates the Contrast Argument. It targets the following claim: there could be an undetermined free act done by S such that S would have freely done something else had S not done the act in question. This modal claim will be endorsed not only by proponents of main brands of libertarianism, but also by action theorists of (...)
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  28.  24
    Is Fallible Knowledge Attributable?E. J. Coffman - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):73-83.
    Here are two prima facie plausible theses about propositional knowledge: a belief could still constitute knowledge even if the belief is justified in a way that’s compatible with its being either false or accidentally true; each instance of knowledge is related to its subject in a way similar to that in which each intentional action is related to its agent. Baron Reed develops and defends a novel argument for the incompatibility of and. In this paper, I clarify and critically assess (...)
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  29.  66
    How to Make an Effort: A Reply to E. J. Coffman.Jing Zhu - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (1):23-33.
    Abstract In ?On Making an Effort? E. J. Coffman develops what he takes to be a fairly serious problem for Robert Kane's positive theory of free choice, where the concept of efforts of will is pivotal.1 Coffman argues that the plausibility of Kane's libertarian account of free choice ?is inversely proportional to the plausibility of a certain principle of agency? (p. 12). And since the latter is quite plausible, the former is therefore ?at best fairly implausible? (p. 12). (...)
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  30.  56
    On the Meaning of Chance in Biology.James A. Coffman - 2014 - Biosemiotics 7 (3):377-388.
    Chance has somewhat different meanings in different contexts, and can be taken to be either ontological or epistemological . Here I argue that, whether or not it stems from physical indeterminacy, chance is a fundamental biological reality that is meaningless outside the context of knowledge. To say that something happened by chance means that it did not happen by design. This of course is a cornerstone of Darwin’s theory of evolution: random undirected variation is the creative wellspring upon which natural (...)
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  31.  98
    Reply to Coffman on closure and skepticism.Anthony Brueckner - 2008 - Synthese 162 (2):167–171.
    E. J. Coffman defends Peter Klein’s work on epistemic closure against various objections that I raised in an earlier paper. In this paper, I respond to Coffman.
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  32.  27
    The contribution of Anandabodha to Advaita.E. I. Warrier - 1995 - New Delhi: Mittal Publications.
    Introduction Anandabodha is a great name in the history of Advaita Vedanta. This is evident from Dr. Das Gupta's reference to him as "the only author of ...
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  33.  2
    An Introduction to Philosophy.E. I. Watkin (ed.) - 2005 - Sheed & Ward.
    Jacques Maritain's An Introduction to Philosophy was first published in 1931. Since then, this book has stood the test of time as a clear guide to what philosophy is and how to philosophize. Inspired by the Thomistic Revival called for by Leo XIII, Maritain relies heavily on Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas to shape a philosophy that, far from sectarian theology in disguise, is driven by reason and engages the modern world. Re-released as part of the Sheed & Ward Classic (...)
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  34. A Philosophy of Form. Revised and englarged edition.E. I. Watkin - 1952 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 14 (1):179-182.
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  35. Consistent Empiricism.E. I. Watkin - 1952 - Hibbert Journal 51:29.
     
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  36. Men and Tendencies.E. I. Watkin - 1937 - Sheed & Ward.
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  37. Poets and Mystics.E. I. Watkin - 1954 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 16 (2):354-356.
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  38. Roman Catholicism in England, from the Reformation to 1950.E. I. Watkin - 1958 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 20 (2):364-364.
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  39. Theism, agnosticism and atheism.E. I. Watkin - 1936 - London: J. Heritage, The Unicorn Press.
  40.  6
    The Bow in the Clouds: An Essay Towards the Integration of Experience.E. I. Watkin - 2013 - Sheed & Ward.
    This is a new release of the original 1932 edition.
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  41. The Balance of Truth.E. I. Watkin - 1943 - Hollis & Carter.
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  42. The Catholic Centre.E. I. Watkin - 1939 - Sheed & Ward.
     
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  43.  7
    Arthur J. Arberry—A Tribute1: E. I. J. ROSENTHAL.E. I. J. Rosenthal - 1970 - Religious Studies 6 (4):297-302.
    Everyone interested in Arabic and Persian literature, in Islam and in comparative religion, regrets the death of Arthur J. Arberry, Sir Thomas Adams's Professor of Arabic in the University of Cambridge. Arberry combined rare human qualities and exceptional professional attainment, and this enabled him to make a unique contribution both to learning and to mutual understanding between East and West. He had a deep sense of vocation, which he brought to his unremitting labours as a skilled editor of texts, especially (...)
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  44. Ėvoli︠u︡t︠s︡ionnai︠a︡ biologii︠a︡: istorii︠a︡ i teorii︠a︡.Ė. I. Kolchinskiĭ (ed.) - 1999 - Sankt-Peterburg: [SPbFIIET RAN].
     
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  45.  6
    Lichnostʹ, rechʹ i i︠u︡ridicheskai︠a︡ praktika: mezhvuzovskiĭ sbornik nauchnykh trudov.E. I. Dulimov (ed.) - 1999 - Rostov-na-Donu: Donskoĭ i︠u︡rid. in-t.
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  46. Iskusstvo i kommunikat︠s︡ii︠a︡.E. I︠A︡ Basin - 2015 - Sankt-Peterburg: Aleteĭi︠a︡.
    Ėstetika antichnosti -- Ėstetika srednikh vekov -- Ėstetika vozrozhdenii︠a︡ -- Ėstetika frant︠s︡uzskogo prosveshchenii︠a︡ -- Ėstetika nemet︠s︡kogo prosveshchenii︠a︡ -- Ėstetika angliĭskogo prosveshchenii︠a︡ -- Ėstetika "Buri i natiska" -- Nemet︠s︡kai︠a︡ klassicheskai︠a︡ ėstetika.
     
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  47.  4
    Iskusstvo i vzgli︠a︡d (glaza): Antologii︠a︡, statʹi.E. I︠A︡ Basin - 2013 - Moskva: BFRGTZ "Slovo".
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  48.  8
    Iskusstvo i voobrazhenie.E. I︠A︡ Basin - 2011 - Moskva: Slovo.
    В книгу вошли высказывания об искусстве и воображении философов, эстетиков, психологов, искусствоведов и мастеров искусства.
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  49.  6
    Khudozhnik i tvorchestvo.E. I︠A︡ Basin - 2008 - Moskva: Gumanitariĭ.
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    Logika khudozhestvennogo tvorchestva: statʹi i khrestomatii︠a︡.E. I︠A︡ Basin - 2011 - Moskva: Slovo.
    Вниманию читателя предлагаются статьи, посвященные мало исследованным проблемам логики (и психологии) художественного творчества, в частности в работах М. Бахтина. Книга содержит также хрестоматию "Искусство и логика" и предметный указатель.
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